Over the past two decades, foreign banks have become more important in domestic financial intermediation, heightening the need to understand the behavior of foreign banks better. Using a new, comprehensive database on bank ownership for 137 countries over the period [1995][1996][1997][1998][1999][2000][2001][2002][2003][2004][2005][2006][2007][2008][2009], identifying also the home country of banks, we document substantial increases in foreign bank presence in many countries. We also show large heterogeneity in terms of home and host countries, bilateral patterns, and performance. In terms of impact, we find a negative relation between private credit and foreign bank presence, but only in countries with relatively distant foreign banks. Furthermore, leading up to the crisis, private credit grew faster when foreign bank presence was large, but not in countries with relatively distant foreign banks. In addition, foreign banks reduced credit more compared to domestic banks during the global crisis in countries where they have a small role in financial intermediation, but not so when they were dominant or funded through local deposits. Our results show that accounting for heterogeneity is crucial to better understand the implications of foreign bank ownership.
Introduction
Although interrupted by the recent financial crisis, the past two decades have seen an unprecedented degree of globalization, especially in financial services. Not only have crossborder bank (and other capital) flows increased dramatically, but also many banks, from both advanced and developing countries, have ventured abroad and established presence in other countries. Although there are exceptions and regional differences, few countries have been left out from this trend of increased financial integration.
Given the importance of foreign banks in many countries, understanding the motivations of foreign banks to enter a particular host country, the mode by which they do so, and the impact they have on financial sector development and lending stability has become essential. These questions have become even more prominent as a result of the financial crisis. Although much research has been conducted, many questions remain unanswered, however, partly because data availability has been limited.
This paper contributes to the literature on foreign banking in three ways. First, introducing and using a new and comprehensive database on bank ownership, including the home country of foreign banks, covering 137 countries from 1995 to 2009, it describes salient facts on trends in foreign bank ownership. Second, it re-examines the link between foreign bank presence and private credit. Third, it re-examines the link between foreign bank presence and financial stability, focusing on the recent financial crisis.
We document a sharp increase in foreign bank ownership from 1995 to 2009 affecting a large number of countries. However, much heterogeneity exists with respect to the relative importance of foreign banks in the host country, the home country of the parent bank, the bilateral patterns, and the business models used by and performance of foreign banks. Our empirical analyses show that the link between foreign bank participation and private credit depends importantly on the average distance between parent bank and host country. Only when this distance is relatively large does a negative correlation between the two exist. In addition, in the years leading up to the crisis private credit growth was faster in countries with a larger presence of foreign banks but only when their parents were located in neighboring countries. When studying the link between foreign bank presence and financial stability, we find that during the global financial crisis foreign banks reduced credit more compared to domestic banks in countries where the level of foreign bank participation is relatively low.
However, in countries with high levels of foreign bank participation foreign bank behavior (Detragiache, Gupta, and Tressel, 2008; Beck and Martinez Peria, 2007) . This can undermine overall access to financial services, since cherry picking worsens the remaining credit pool, and lower financial development, especially in low-income countries where relationship lending is important. Indeed, Detragiache, Tressel and Gupta (2008) show the presence of foreign banks in low-income countries to be associated with less credit being extended.
However, Cull and Martinez Peria (2007) show that this relationship disappears or even reverses once crisis-induced acquisition of (distressed) banks by foreigners is accounted for.
Besides the impact of foreign banks on the development and efficiency of the domestic financial sector, many studies examined the impact of foreign banks on financial stability. Some papers find that global banks support their foreign affiliates during times of financial stress through internal capital markets Van Lelyveld, 2006 and  and Barba-Navaretti, Calzolari, Levi and Pozzolo, 2010) . At the same time, however, a number of studies show that (funding) shocks to parent banks can be transmitted to their foreign subsidiaries with negative consequences for their lending Rosengren (1999, 2000) ; Acharya and Schnabl (2010) , Chava and Purnandam (2011) ; Cetorelli and Goldberg, 2011) . Studying the global financial crisis, studies showed that foreign subsidiaries reduced lending more compared to domestic banks (Popov and Udell 2010; De Haas, Korniyenko, Loukoianova and Pivovarsk 2011; De Haas and Van Lelyveld 2011) . Ongena, Peydro Alcalde and Van Horen (2011) , however, show for Eastern European countries that while foreign banks reduced lending more compared to locally funded domestic banks, they did not compared to banks that had financed their lending from international capital markets.
Although providing very interesting and valuable insights, these studies analyze in
general only a limited number of countries and/or a selected number of (large) banks. While this can allow for a more careful isolation of the mechanisms the authors are after, it can come at the cost of not being able to generalize the results or to address the influence of heterogeneity across foreign banks. By introducing and using a new, comprehensive database covering (close to) the universe of domestic and foreign banks over a lengthy period, this paper extends the literature on foreign banking in regard to two important questions: One, how does foreign bank ownership affect private credit? And two, how does foreign bank ownership affect financial stability? As the database includes the home country of each foreign bank, we also study the impact of bilateral factors, which up till now received only limited attention due to data limitations. This is important given the interplay between home and host countries features in entry decisions (Berger, Buch, DeLong, and DeYoung, 2004; Galindo, Micco and Serra 2003, and Claessens and Van Horen, 2010) and between (cultural and institutional) distance and performance (Claessens and Van Horen, 2011) .
The paper itself is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the database. Section 3 provides an overview of the main trends in foreign banking, and highlights the heterogeneity and differences in foreign bank ownership. Section 4 examines the impact of foreign bank ownership on private credit in the host country. Section 5 studies the impact of foreign bank ownership on lending stability during the global financial crisis. Section 6 concludes.
Data
This paper uses an original and newly collected database on bank ownership. For each year and for each bank in our sample, we determined the exact moment of entry and exit. If the exact year of establishment could not be determined, but additional information indicated that the bank was in operation prior to 1995 (e.g., the presence of financial statements), we coded 1500 as the fictive year of establishment. 4 In terms of exit, we took in general the year a bank became inactive in Bankscope as the year of exit. In all cases, we cross-checked this using additional sources and made corrections if necessary. In addition, we carefully accounted for mergers and acquisitions to make sure that only the merged entity or the acquiring bank remained in the sample after a take-over.
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1 In building the database, many sources were used, including Bankscope, individual banks' annual reports, corporate governance reports, Central Bank publications and web-sites, information from banking regulation agencies, local stock exchanges, US SEC forms F-20, parent company's reports, The Economist Intelligence Unit, Factiva, The Banker, etc. 2 Our sample includes all countries with more than 5 active banks reporting to Bankscope in 2008. For the advanced countries in our sample, we restrict our coverage to the 100 largest banks in terms of 2008 assets, so smaller (typically regional) banks are not included in the database for these countries. For all these countries, we cover at least 90 percent of the banking system in terms of assets. 3 Including bank holdings and holding companies can potentially lead to double counting as both the holding company and the bank are often included in Bankscope. In all countries where bank holdings were included, we excluded the holding company if the bank itself was represented 4 For 134 banks (2.5 percent of our sample) we were not able to find the exact year of establishment nor could we determine whether the bank was active prior to 1995. In these cases the year of establishment is left blank. For each bank in every year, we identified its shareholders, the nationality of the shareholder(s), and recorded any change in ownership. We classified a bank as foreign-owned using the definition generally applied in the literature, i.e., if 50 percent or more of its shares are owned by foreigners. For all foreign banks we summed the percentages of shares held by foreigners by country of residence, with the country with the highest percentage of shares then considered the home country. 6 Ownership, and country of ownership, is based on direct ownership, i.e., we do not consider indirect ownership. We do, however, take into account that in some cases the direct owner is an entity purely established for tax purposes. In such cases we recorded the country of nationality of the ultimate owner as the source country (these cases typically involve entities registered in Mauritius, Panama and Luxembourg).
When determining ownership, we erred on the side of caution and reported ownership as missing when the reliability of the information was in question.
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Using this procedure we determined complete ownership structure, including the home country of the largest foreign shareholder, for 5,059 of the 5,377 banks in the sample (i.e., 94 percent) for all the years each bank was active. For 92 banks only partial ownership and for 226 banks no ownership could be determined. All in all, the data provide an almost complete picture of bank ownership around the world and changes therein over time.
Compared to other databases on bank ownership used in the literature (most notably the one constructed by Micco, Panizza and Yañez 2007) our database differs in a number of respects: First, it includes virtually all banks active in a particular country, which allows not only for the comparison of domestic and foreign banks but also for comparisons of types of banks (i.e., small versus large, old versus young, deposit taking versus non-deposit taking).
Second, it includes countries at all levels of development, allowing one to test whether foreign banks behave differently (from domestic banks) in certain countries. Third, it captures bank ownership and changes therein over an extensive time period, allowing one to disentangle short-run versus long-run implications of foreign ownership. Fourth, as it includes the home country of foreign banks, it allows one to differentiate between foreign banks from different types of home countries and examine the impact of bilateral factors (like distance, trade linkages, institutional similarity, etc.) on the behavior of foreign banks.
Trends and heterogeneity in foreign banking
Over the period 1995 to 2009, banking systems in many countries experienced important transformations. 8 While the total number of domestic and foreign banks in our sample stayed virtually the same (3,894 in 1995 and 3,910 in 2009) , these aggregate numbers mask two counteracting trends (Table 1) . 9 The number of domestic banks decreased by about 17 percent, due to consolidation driven by technological changes and deregulation in many Two more two facts are noteworthy. First, the large dispersion in the average size of banks across host countries, with little apparent relation to the number of foreign banks present in the country (Figure 4c ). And second, the fact that the share of foreign banks in numbers is less than the share in terms of assets at low levels of presence in numbers, and the reverse at higher level of presence in numbers (Figure 4d ). This suggests that foreign banks tend to be small when few in numbers and large when they dominate the market in numbers. Not only do distributions across home and host country differ, but foreign bank presence also differs bilaterally. Table 2 shows strong regional patterns in foreign bank presence, with the diagonal entries showing much larger presence. For example, of the foreign banks coming from the Americas, 63% are present in the same region and only 37%
elsewhere. Figure 7a and b depict this regional pattern in more detail in the form of heat-maps for respectively the number share of foreign banks from a particular home country going to a certain host country, and the assets share of foreign banks in a particular host country coming from a certain home country. Both Figures show the same, strong regional pattern.
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Finally, foreign banks can differ from domestic banks in their business models, size and profitability, with some of these differences to vary by level of host country development.
Figures 8a-8d plot a number of balance sheets and performance measures for domestic and foreign banks against the host countries' GDP per capita. The figures show much heterogeneity, but also some differences which vary by level of development.
12 This regional pattern may not surprise since research has shown that foreign banks tend to follow their customers and therefore enter countries with strong trade linkages (e.g., Goldberg and Grosse 1994). In addition, studies have found that banks tend to invest in countries that are (geographical and/or institutional) close (e.g., Buch and De Long (2004) ; Galindo, Micco and Serra 2003) ). Furthermore, Claessens and Van Horen (2010) show not only absolute distance to matters but also the distance of competitor countries.
Loan to deposits ratio ( Figure 8a ) is a proxy for the degree to which banks are active in traditional forms of financial intermediation, i.e., lending, and the importance of wholesale funding relative to traditional deposits. This ratio tends to be higher for domestic banks compared to foreign banks, consistent with the notion than foreign banks are relatively less active in lending. This is especially so in lower income countries. However, in middle-income countries, foreign banks tend to have higher loan to deposits ratios, suggesting that they are more active in lending and more able to attract non-deposit sources of funding. Foreign banks also tend to have significant more liquid assets (Figure 8b ), especially so in high-income countries, but less so in middle-income countries.
In terms of solvency, foreign banks tend to have higher ratios of capital to weighted assets, especially in high-income and developing countries, and less so in middle-income countries ( Figure 8c ). This suggests that foreign banks are more conservative with respect to their capital buffers. In terms of performance, foreign banks tend to underperform domestic banks in middle-income and developing countries ( Figure 8d ). This may surprise since foreign banks, with greater access to know-how, technology and lower cost of funds, are generally believed to be more profitable in such markets. Some of this probably reflects differences in activities, such as the fact that foreign banks have more conservative portfolios.
However, it may also reflect differences of origin of foreign banks and variations in the ease by which they operate in emerging markets and developing countries. 
Foreign banks and domestic credit creation
In this section we re-examine the link between foreign ownership and the provision of credit to the private sector. The extent to which foreign banks contribute to financial sector development is possibly one of the most controversial aspects of foreign bank entry. Although some studies have looked at the relationship between private credit and foreign bank ownership (most notably Detragiache, Tressel and Gupta 2008 and Martinez Peria 2007) , surprisingly is known under what conditions foreign ownership positively relates to private credit and when negatively. Given the substantial differences across foreign banks as 13 Claessens and Van Horen (2011) show that the profitability of foreign banks is importantly affected by home, host and institutional factors. They find, for example, that foreign banks perform better when from a high income country and when regulations in the host country are relatively weak. Also foreign banks from home countries with the same language and similar regulation as the host country tend to perform better. These factors may explain some of the differences in the simple averages.
highlighted in the previous section, allowing for different types of heterogeneity can potentially be important.
Methodology
To assess the impact of foreign bank ownership on the provision of credit, we first use cross-country OLS regressions to test whether foreign bank presence is associated with higher or lower levels of private credit and what factors are driving this relationship. Our sample consists of 111 countries that, contrary to other studies, represent all levels of development.
Our dependent variable is the ratio of private credit to GDP (from the IMF International Financial Statistics). We take the 3-year average (2005) (2006) (2007) between the host country and the home country of all foreign banks active in the host country.
Next we take the median of this variable across host countries. The variable Distant banks is one if the average distance for the host country is above this median and zero otherwise.
The empirical model we estimate is as follows:
Y is the ratio of private credit to GDP in host country i, i FB is the share of bank assets held by foreign banks, i X is a matrix of variables that are expected to affect the relationship between foreign presence and the provision of credit, i Z is a matrix of control variables, i  is the error term and α, β, γ and δ are parameters to be estimated. Our parameters of interest are β and γ. We estimate our model using OLS regressions with robust standard errors.
The obvious drawback of this type of cross-sectional regression is that the market share of foreign banks could be endogenous to the host country's financial development. As also pointed out by Detragiache, Tressel and Gupta (2008) the bias could, however, run both ways. On the one hand, foreign banks might be more willing to enter countries where (for other reasons) financial development is particularly low as they expect these markets to grow faster. On the other hand, business prospects might be worse in countries with low levels of development, making foreign banks more reluctant to enter.
One way to address this endogeneity problem is to estimate a panel regression.
However, due to the short sample period (balance sheet information is only reliably available from 2004 onwards) and the credit boom that took place in many countries before the global financial crisis, the private credit to GDP ratio is high persistent (which results in failure of the autocorrelation tests). As an alternative we therefore estimate regressions in which we test differencing the data we directly control for unobserved country-specific effects that might affect the level of private credit. This second set of regressions we estimate is thus as follows: 15 The model is estimated using OLS with robust standard errors. Table 3 presents the results of our cross-country regression. We find a negative correlation between the presence of foreign banks and private credit to GDP (Table 3 , column 1). A one standard deviation increase in Foreign presence is associated with a decline in private credit by some 6 percentage points, economically significant, since the average ratio of private credit to GDP in our sample is 50 percent. We also find some evidence of a nonlinear relationship (column 2). This, however, is mostly driven by a few outliers: high-income countries with very large financial sectors compared to the size of their economy that are either dominated by foreign banks (Hong Kong, Ireland and New Zealand) or with hardly any foreign banks (Iceland). When we exclude these countries, we find again a negative (linear) relation that is even stronger (not reported).
Empirical results
Pooling all countries, however, masks significant differences across countries. If we split our sample between high-income (OECD and non-OECD) countries and emerging markets and developing countries, we find the relation with foreign bank presence to vary with economic development. For the group of high-income countries (columns 3-4), we find no significant relationship between foreign ownership and credit. However, as column 5 and 6
show, for emerging markets and developing countries there is a strong negative relationship between foreign banks presence and credit. A one standard deviation increase in Foreign presence is associated with a decline in private credit of 5 percentage points (compared to a mean private credit to GDP ratio of 30 percent in this group of countries).
In terms of our control variables, we find (as expected) GDP per capita to be generally associated with more financial development and inflation with less financial development, except for high-income countries, where both variables are not significant, in part as differences are limited in these countries. Access to creditor information has a positive impact on financial sector development, but is imprecisely estimated. In emerging markets and developing countries, the longer it takes for contracts to be enforced, the less credit is created.
Next, we investigate for the sample of emerging markets and developing countries whether the effect of foreign bank presence differs by type of host country and type of foreign bank. 16 First, we test whether the impact of foreign bank presence differs between developing countries and emerging markets. The result in Table 4 column 1 shows that this is indeed the case. We find that foreign bank presence is only negatively related to private credit to GDP in developing countries. This confirms the results of Detragiache, Tressel and Gupta (2008) .
In the next column we investigate whether distance affects the relationship between foreign bank presence and private credit. Here results indicate that foreign bank presence is only negatively related to private credit when foreign banks are relatively distant. This is in line with theoretical and empirical evidence that suggests that distance increases information asymmetries between bank and borrower (e.g., Hauswald and Marquez 2006, Mian 2006) .
We next run a horserace between the impact of economic development of the host country and of the relative distance. Our results (column 3) show the negative relationship between foreign bank presence and private credit to be driven by the type of foreign banks that enter the country, not so much by the level of development of the host country. Although one has to be careful to make any inferences about the direction of causality, these results suggest that in emerging markets and developing countries entry of foreign banks that are more remote can lead to cream-skimming which negatively affects access to credit.
A number of studies have found evidence that the behavior of foreign banks might be related to the relative importance of foreign banks in the host country. For example, Claessens and Lee (2003) find fewer spillovers with more limited entry. And Cull and Martinez Peria (2007) show that in countries where foreign banks hold more than 10 percent of the assets, private credit was significantly higher than in other countries before, during and after crises.
Since the relative importance of foreign bank presence varies a lot across the countries in our sample (see Section 3), it is natural to examine whether some kind of threshold effect exists with respect to the relative importance of foreign banks in the host country.
Therefore, we split our sample of emerging market and developing countries between countries where foreign banks control less than half of the assets in the country and countries in which they hold more than half. The results in the last two columns show the negative relation between distant foreign banks and private credit to be driven by countries where foreign banks control less than half the assets. This could suggest that foreign banks are more likely to invest in (large) domestic banks that engage in financial intermediation in countries they are more familiar with (i.e., those that are geographically close). In contrast, in more distant countries foreign banks are more likely to enter through a greenfield investment with a focus to remain a niche player, targeting only specific customers. higher credit growth (compared to a mean credit growth for these countries of 28 percent).
We cannot reject the null hypothesis of joint significance of Foreign presence and
Foreign presence*Distant banks, suggesting that in host countries with relative distant foreign banks, the actual importance of these banks in the domestic financial system did not affect private credit growth in the boom years. This holds for emerging markets and developing countries as well as for high-income countries.
Foreign banks and financial stability during the global financial crisis
The role of foreign banks in lending stability has received renewed attention amidst the current financial turmoil. Concerns have been raised that, when faced with capital or funding shocks, foreign banks withdraw from cross-border banking activities, and reduce credit extension in host markets. While most studies (in large part due to data limitations) focus on specific regions (often Central and Eastern Europe), our database allows us to study how the global financial crisis has affected lending stability of foreign banks in a large number of countries. This allows us to analyze how different levels of development and differences in relative market share of foreign banks affect foreign bank behavior. Furthermore, our database includes virtually all domestic and foreign banks, allowing for a detailed comparison of the stability of lending for both types of banks. Finally, since we know the home country of all foreign banks, we can examine whether foreign banks owned by certain home countries are a more stable source of credit. We add a number of controls. We control for time-invariant differences between banks (like different business models, funding structure, strategies, etc.) using bank fixed effects.
Methodology
We control for differences across countries by including country-year fixed effects. To the extent that there are no systematic differences with respect to the type of firms in the portfolios of foreign versus domestic banks or those differences are not correlated with crisisinduced shocks to credit demand, these fixed effects should control for differential changes in credit demand across countries. We control for a number of bank-specific characteristics that we interact with our two crisis dummies to allow for differential impact of the crisis by type of bank. These characteristics are Size (log assets), Solvency (equity to asset ratio), Liquidity (liquid to total assets) and Deposits (deposits to liabilities). All bank characteristics are measured as of end-2007 to limit any endogeneity problems.
Our baseline model is as follows: To estimate our model we use three procedures. First we estimate the model using fixed effects OLS excluding the lagged dependent variable. Second, we include the lagged dependent variable to assure that our results are not biased due to the existence of serial autocorrelation. Third, to allow for the fact that lagged loan growth might be correlated with the panel effects (Nickell, 1981) we estimate the model using difference GMM with the lags of the levels of the explanatory and dependent variables as instruments (Arellano and Bond 1991) . In all models, standard errors are clustered at the bank level and observations below the 1 st percentile and above the 99 th percentile of loan growth are excluded to reduce the impact of possibly influential outliers.
Empirical results
Our regression results are presented in Table 6 . We first present our three regression specifications based on our full sample of countries (column 1 In the next columns, we split our sample in countries where foreign banks hold less than 50 percent of domestic assets (column 4-6) and countries in which they hold more than 50 percent (column 7-9). The results indicate a very distinct difference between the two groups of countries. We find the loan growth of foreign banks in 2009 compared to that of domestic banks to be 8 percent less in countries where they have a low market share (the results in column 4). In countries where they dominate, however, foreign banks actually do not show any difference in their loan growth in 2009 compared to domestic banks. This result clearly shows how important it is to allow for heterogeneity across foreign banks when examining their (crisis) behavior.
Following the base regression, we allow the impact of foreign ownership on lending stability to differ with respect to a number of home and host country, and bank characteristics.
The results, presented in Table 7 , are based on the fixed effects model without a lagged dependent variable. The results, however, are similar using the other two procedures.
In the first two regressions we examine whether this difference in credit growth was specific to particular host countries. First, we examine, using an OECD versus non-OECD country dummy, whether the general economic development of the host country played a role.
We find ( impacted the lending stability of foreign banks. Even though we found the average distance of foreign banks to have affected the provision of credit, we do not find a differential impact between foreign banks that are close or that are distant.
Next, we examine the importance of home country characteristics. First, we allow the impact of foreign bank ownership on lending stability to differ between foreign banks owned by a parent located in an OECD country or in a non-OECD country. Somewhat surprising, we do not find significant differences between the two types of foreign banks (column 3). This may be because not all OECD countries were as severely affected by the financial crisis. We to domestic banks; however, the parameter is imprecisely estimated. 18 We also examined the impact of foreign ownership on lending behavior in the four income groups (OECD countries, other high-income countries, emerging markets and developing countries) separately. We found similar magnitude and significance for the foreign ownership times crisis interactions for all regions except other high-income countries, where we found no significant difference.
Finally, we examine whether having access to local deposits is more important for foreign than for domestic banks. In principle, the relation can go two ways. On the one hand, foreign banks that are large local deposit-takers might be less affected by shocks to their parents' balance sheets. On the other hand, as shown by Cetorelli and Goldberg (2011) , parent banks faced with funding shocks might be inclined to transfer funds from those subsidiaries more active in deposit-taking. Our results (column 5) show that the first effect dominates:
having a strong deposit base is especially important for foreign banks in maintaining lending.
While one standard deviation increase in the deposit to liability ratio increases credit growth of domestic banks by some 3 percentage points, it is 7 percentage points for foreign banks.
Summarizing our results, we find that on average foreign banks reduced lending more compared to domestic banks during the global crisis. As such, foreign banks arguably contributed to financial instability. Important heterogeneity exists, however, some of which we document. When dominant in a banking system, foreign banks turned out to not react differently to the crisis than domestic banks. And foreign banks that generated an important part of their funding from local deposits were much less likely to reduce lending.
Conclusions
The potential benefits and risks of foreign bank presence have been studied for some time.
Still, little is known about how foreign banks improve the efficiency of domestic financial systems, increase financial sector development and access to financial services, and enhance countries' overall economic growth. Furthermore, the crisis has highlighted again that there can be risks associated with cross-border banking and foreign bank presence. These developments have led to an increased demand among policy makers and interest among academics for more analyses of the benefits and risks of foreign bank presence to help guide regulatory reforms.
Research and policy questions being asked include: for which types of countries and under which circumstances do foreign banks add the most to domestic financial sector development; given that the impact of foreign ownership is less advantageous for countries with a certain level of development, which institutions are most important to improve when having greater foreign bank presence; when does the presence of foreign banks help mitigate the effects of various shocks on host countries' banking systems and when do they not; do These and other issues will be well served by more in-depth research that in turn can enhance policy recommendations on how to appropriately regulate foreign banks. The database documented and analyzed in this paper can help with research on these topics. It
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